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Quais os determinantes de entrada e saída de firmas no Brasil? Como a natalidade 
e a mortalidade de firmas afetam a produtividade da indústria manufatureira no 
país? Este artigo procura responder estas questões utilizando dados de painel para 
104 setores da indústria manufatureira brasileira (3 dígitos) para o período 1996-
2002. Os resultados das estimações mostram que a participação das exportações 
no produto setorial é um importante determinante das taxas de entrada e saída. Os 
resultados sugerem ainda que em anos de declínio do PIB per capita a propensão 
a exportar está associada com a entrada de firmas, enquanto em anos de 
crescimento do PIB o crescimento setorial é positivamente associado com a 
entrada liquida de empresas. Finalmente, os resultados mostram que a saída de 
empresas  (e em menor grau, a entrada e entrada líquida) é um determinante 
robusto da produtividade total dos fatores entre os setores no Brasil. 
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Abstract 
What are the determinants of firm entry and exit in Brazil? How do entry and exit 
rates affect productivity? This paper tries to answer these questions using panel 
data for about 104 Brazilian manufacturing sectors (3-digit level) for the period 
1996 to 2002. Our results show that the share of exports in sectoral output is one 
main determinant of entry and exit rates. The results also suggest that in years of 
real per capita GDP decline, export propensity is associated with entry rates, 
while in years of GDP expansion, sectoral growth is positively associated with 
net entry. Finally, our results show that exit (and to a lesser extent, entry and net 
entry) is a very robust determinant of total factor productivity across industrial 
sectors in Brazil.  
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Firm Entry and Exit in Brazil:  






Since at least the work of Joseph Schumpeter, the process of firm creation and firm 
destruction has been at the very heart of the process of economic development. Newly 
created firms always innovate (at some level), their mere existence increase competition and 
put pressure on incumbents to improve their performance. For developed countries, there is a 
well-established literature looking into the main determinants and overall consequences of 
the process of entry and exit at the firm, sector, industry and country levels (Geroski, 1995). 
A similar literature is now starting to emerge for developing countries. One initial hypothesis 
motivating this newer branch of literature is that entry rates would be lower in developing 
countries and that this could turn out to be extremely helpful in explaining the large cross-
country variation we observe in levels of productivity per worker. One reason for the 
expectation that entry would be systematically lower in poorer countries is that barriers to 
entry and exit seem to be much more powerful and complex than in developed countries. 
Consider the effects of, for instance, financial sectors that are underdeveloped, skilled labour 
that is often in short supply and rule and regulations that are cumbersome and unpredictable. 
Yet the first figures suggest that the difference of the entry and exit rates is considerably 
smaller than initially thought (Tybout, 2000).  
The finding that entry and exit rates are not that different in developed and developing 
countries raises two general groups of questions: one on measurement (are we measuring 
entry and exit rates appropriately and in a sufficiently diverse number of developing 
countries?) and another on the process itself (what are the main determinants of entry and exit 
rates in developing countries and how do they differ from those in developed countries?)  
In this paper, we try to answer three specific questions: (a) What are the features of the 
process of firm entry and exit in developing countries? (b) What are the determinants of firm 
entry and exit rates? And (c) How do entry and exit rates affect average sectoral productivity?  
To do so, we put together a unique data set with annual observations covering about 100 
Brazilian manufacturing sectors (3-digit classification) for the period from 1996 to 2002. Our 
data set is the result of the combination of two sources: CEMPRE and PIA. The CEMPRE 
(firm registry) data set provides gross entry, gross exit and net entry rates at the level of three-
digit industrial sector, annually from 1996 onwards. The PIA data set is an annual industrial 
survey that provides, inter alia, concentration ratios, export propensities as well as the 
information required to estimate total factor productivity. The merging of these two data sets 
allow us a very first glimpse into the determinants of entry and exit (broadly defined as 
encompassing gross entry, gross exit and net entry) in Brazilian manufacturing, in the period 
immediately after successful macroeconomic stabilization.1 
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1 Over two terms, from 1994 to 2002, the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso implemented a number of 
crucial reforms, notably, price stabilization, the privatization of state owned enterprises and the consolidation of previous 
trade liberalization efforts (Campos et al., 2003).   3
Our main finding is that the share of exports in sectoral output is a main determinant of 
entry and exit rates. And this is particularly so for those sectors in which a higher proportion 
of exports go to Mercosul countries. They also suggest that in years of real GDP decline 
export propensity is associated with entry rates, while in years of GDP expansion sectoral 
growth is positively associated with net entry. We find little support for the effects of 
concentration and capital-output ratios.  Finally, our results show that gross exit (and to a 
lesser extent, entry and net entry) is a very robust determinant of total factor productivity in 
Brazilian manufacturing.   
The paper is organized in two parts. Section 2 presents a detailed picture of firm entry 
process in Brazilian manufacturing, using annual data for about 100 sectors over a period of 
seven years from 1996 to 2002. Section 3 discusses the determinants of the entry process as 
well as its effects on productivity, over time as well as across sectors. Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Describing Firm Entry and Exit in Brazilian Manufacturing 
In this paper we use two databases. First, the Annual Survey of Mining and 
Manufacturing Industries (PIA) conducted by Brazilian statistical bureau's (IBGE) from 1996 
to 2002. This survey provides economic and financial information of all formally established 
firms with a labor force of 30 or more workers and employees
2, and a random strata of small 
firms (with less than 30 workers). The second database is the firm’s register CEMPRE. 
Covering the period from 1996 to 2002, this register is managed by IBGE on the basis of 
information from the tax register CNPJ, from the labor ministry’s Annual Listing of Social 
Information - RAIS, and from additional sources. CEMPRE covers the population of firms, 
providing information on number of firms, people employed, and wages and other 
remunerations; it is then used only to access the enterprises’ demography statistics.    It is 
worth to acknowledge that PIA and CEMPRE are strictly related to each other since 
CEMPRE is used by IBGE as the base for sample selection of PIA: in 2002, from 148,169 
firms listed in CEMPRE, 40,369 were selected to the sample of PIA. 
From the enterprise-level information of PIA database, we use sector-level 
“aggregations” obtained through IBGE special tabulations
3. From CEMPRE dataset, we get 
sector-level entry and exit statistics
4. We then use data on sectors of activities following the 
three digit National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) code
5, considering only 
the Manufacturing Division with 104 sectors. Mining data is disregarded in this paper. 
For each manufacturing sector i, in every year of period t =1996,….,2002, we consider 
product ( , it Y ), and three conventional aggregate inputs: capital ( , it K ), labor ( , it L ), and 
intermediate input ( , it M ).  
                                                 
2 It is important to acknowledge that PIA is a census of medium and large firms. 
3 To “aggregate” firm-data into sector-level data, IBGE provides special tabulations obtained through sector-level 
estimations. These estimations are founded on the association of a basic sampling weight for each firm covered by the PIA’s 
survey; this weight is defined as the ration between the size of the population and the size of the sample in a given strata. 
IBGE does not give information of sectors with less than 3 firms.  
4 Sector level statistics from CEMPRE are not estimations, since CEMPRE covers the population of firms. Entering and 
exiting firms are identified in the CEMPRE dataset by comparing the firm identity number (the CNPJ tax register) over time. 
In this turn, there is a limitation in the CEMPRE data that will affect the entry/exit results. Ownership changes or legal 
reorganizations lead to changes in firm identity number between years, so the entry and exit statistics used in this paper 
reflect changes in the “birth” and “death” of the firms as well as changes in firm ownership. Then, the demographic statistics 
here presented superestimate the real flows of entry and exit of firms. In spite of this limitation, CEMPRE dataset presents a 
great advantage which is the possibility to observe the whole population and to follow the firm’s evolution, regardless of its 
size. 
5 CNAE is considerably less detailed (283 classes) at the finest grid than the US systems SIC (490 classes) and NAICS (495 
classes). In general, CNAE tends to be more oriented towards the input commodity, whereas NAICS generally classifies 
sectors by the output or final good. However, CNAE and US systems can be compatible, mainly at fairly aggregate levels.    4
•  , it Y : Sector-level output is defined as the difference between “Gross production 
value” for sector i and “Cost of industrial operations” for sector i; this is a constructed 
variable through PIA and can be considered as a proxy of the sector’s value added.  
•  , it K : PIA (from 1996) does not provide information on capital stock for firm neither 
for sector; this is so computed using the perpetual inventory method. In order to 
initialize the sector’s capital series, we work with data on the sectors’ flow of 
investment. We use the difference between sector’s measures “Acquisition of total 
assets” and “Sales of total assets” as a proxy of sector investment flow, where “total 
assets” comprises i) ground and premises; ii) machinery; iii) vehicles; and iv) other 
assets (including computers, furniture, etc)
6. We calculate the initial value of capital 
(0 ) Kt=  using a methodology adapted from Young (1995). The author suggests the 
use of the growth rate of investment in the first five years of the investment series as 
representative of the growth of investment prior to the beginning of the series, when 
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where  0 t I =  is the first year of investment, δ is the depreciation rate, and g is the 
average growth in the first five years of the investment series. Since the short time 
span available for the investment series, we consider g as the average growth in the 
seven years (1996-2002) of the investment series. Besides, we consider three different 
assumptions for δ : 10%,15% and 20%. 
•  , it L : Sector-level labor input in year t is defined as the sum of the “Number of blue 
collar workers earning wages in December 31 st of the year t” for sector i and 
“Number of white collar workers earning wages in December 31 st of the year t” for 
sector i. 
•  , it M : Sector-level intermediate input in year t  is defined as “Purchase of raw 
materials, auxiliary material and components” (which includes package material, fuel 
used as raw material, and lube) for sector i. 
We converted the nominal values into real values at constant 2002 prices using the 
deflator IPA-OG, which is a wholesale price index, published by FGV, covering the entire 
economy, including both imported and domestic goods
7. Nominal values of output and 
intermediate inputs are deflated with a disaggregated price index, IPA-OG/sector, while 
investment flow and capital stock are deflated with an economy-wide price index, IPA-
                                                 
6 Our measure of capital stock considers the aggregation of the 4 asset types; therefore, our perpetual inventory calculation 
considers, from the beginning, the aggregation of all the asset types together, not for each one of these asset types separately.  
 
7 All economic variables in PIA related to the firm’s income statement or to salaries are simple sums of the firm’s monthly 
figures due to Brazil’s legislation – that does not allow deflating flow variables. In a context of inflation, this simple 
methodology depress the January values, while representing just a about the December values. We apply a methodology 
stated in Muendler (2003) to approximate to a more realistic value for the flow variables. Assuming that the monthly values 


















t X is the observed value of the flow variable,  t X is the correct real value of the firm’s annual figure, and  , month t π is 
the according monthly price index. 
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OG/general. 
In order to estimate the sector-level entry equation, we define variables, for each sector i 
in year t, as: gross entry rate ( , it GEnR ); gross exit rate ( , it GExR ); net entry rate ( , it NEnR ); 
concentration ratios ( , 4it CR ) and ( , 8it CR ); growth rate of output ( , it Gr ); capital /output ratio 
( , (/) it KY ); total factor productivity ( , it TFP ); minimum efficient scale ( , it MES ) ; sales to 
Mercosul countries (
, Mercosul
it); sales to non-Mercosul countries (
, N-Mercosul
it). 
•  , it GEnR : based on business register CEMPRE, it is defined as the number of new 
firms in year t divided by the total number of firms in year t-1. 
•  , it GExR : also based on CEMPRE, it is defined as the ratio of the number of firms 
observed in year t-1 but not in year t, divided by the total number of firms in year t-1. 
•  , it NEnR : it is the difference between gross entry rate and gross exit rate. 
•  , 4it CR : it is the ratio of the output of the four to the sector i total output, in year t. 
•  , 8it CR : it is the ratio of the output of the eight to the sector i total output, in year t. 
•  , it Gr : it is the sectoral output growth; it is defined as the growth rate of industry value 
added in year t ( , it Y ); it can be considered as a proxy for market profitability of the 
sector. 
•  , (/) it KY : it is the capital-output ratio, and  is measured as sectoral capital stock 
divided by sectoral value added ( , it K / , it Y )
8. 
•  , it TFP : we measure sectoral TFP through the use of the approximation of Griliches 
and Mairesse (1990) as devised by Muendler (2004)
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for  1/3 σ = . 
•  , it MES : it is here defined as the ratio of the total number of employees in the industry 
i to the total number of firms in the industry i in year t. 
•  , cos it Mer ul : is the share of sector i sales to Mercosul countries in year t. Mercosul is 
a free trade agreement involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, in 
effect since 1991. 
•  , -c o s it NM e r u l: is the share of sector i sales to non- Mercosul countries in year t 
 
Basic Statistics 
As already stated, we start with a sample of 104 3-digit manufacturing sector. We then 
drop 5 sectors that report only information on exit and entry statistics (from CEMPRE), but 
not economic and financial data (from PIA). Next we delete one more sector that has less 
than 3 firms, for what PIA does not give information. Then we finally consider a sample of 
98 3-digit sector. Table 2.1 presents the basic statistics of all the variables using pooled data.  
. The average net entry rate of the whole manufacturing industry in this 6 year time was 
                                                 
8 The capital stock was computed, through the use of the perpetual inventory method, with the depreciation rate of 10%. 
9 To employ this approximation, we consider  , it Y as the “Gross production value”, and not as the difference between “Gross 
production value” and “Cost of Industrial Operations” (which is a proxy of the sector value-added). Capital stock calculation 
was done trough the perpetual inventory method using the depreciation rate of 10%.   6
4.06%; the maximum value was 36.17% and the minimum was -22.00%. We find large 
variations in the entry process across sectors, varying from a high gross entry rate of 44.49% 
in “Metallic scrap manufacturing” to a low gross entry rate of 0.00% in “Petroleum refining”, 
among others. The maximum of gross exit rate is 33.33% in “Coal products manufacturing” 
and the minimum is 0.0% in “Petroleum refining”, among others. Overall, Brazilian 
manufacturing industry seems to present a quite relevant entry process dynamics; its average 
gross entry rate is 13.86%, surpassing the average gross exit rate of 9.80% (See Table 2.1). 
This is a quite similar performance of Europe and USA; Klapper et al (2004) found gross 
entry rates of 11.07% and 6.65% for the European and North-American manufacturing 
industry, respectively.  
An useful way of summarizing the movement in the entry distributions, which is more 
appropriated when a large number of sectors are involved, is to group the separate year-basis 
kernel densities of gross entry, gross exit, and net entry rates for the whole period 1997-2002 
(see Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). There seems to be a leftward shift in both gross 
entry and gross exit distribution over time, which can indicates that firm creation and 
destruction are decreasing across sectors. On the other hand, regarding the net entry 
distribution over time there seems to be an alternated trend; it decreases from 1997 to 2001, 
but increases in 2002.  
 
3. The Determinants of Entry, Exit and Productivity in Brazilian Manufacturing 
The objective of this section is to try to investigate the determinants of the entry process 
(broadly defined as encompassing gross entry, gross exit and net entry) as well as its effects 
on productivity, over time and across industrial sectors. Geroski (1995) provides a strong 
motivation for this exercise. He constructs a list of stylized facts about firm entry in 
developed countries. He argues that although entry (or firm creation) is very common (that is, 
large number of firms start production very year) and cross-sectoral variation in terms of 
entry is very large, “differences in entry between industries do not persist for very long. In 
fact, most of the total variation in entry across industries and over time is 'within' industry 
variation rather than 'between' industry variation.” Further, he makes two additional claims 
that are worth calling attention to: one is that “entry rates are hard to explain using 
conventional measures of profitability and entry barriers” and the other is that “high rates of 
entry are often associated with high rates of innovation and increases in efficiency.” These 
are all features of entry in developed countries. One overarching question behind this exercise 
is whether these features are also observed in developing countries. In other words, is it also 
very difficult to explain the variation of entry rates over time and across sectors using 
conventional measures? Are entry rates also associated with productivity increases in 
developing countries? 
The empirical strategy we use is in two stages. Firstly, we estimate the determinants of 
entry rates across sectors and over time and, secondly, we estimate whether or not the three 
facets of the entry process affect productivity. In order to look more closely into the entry 
process we estimate variations of the following models by Geroski (1995) and Tybout 
(1996b), respectively: 
 
Entry or exit rates = f  (CR4, industry capital output ratio, minimum efficient scale) 
    
 
Entry or exit rates = f  (real output growth, CR4, industry capital/output ratio,       
 year dummies, industry dummies)   
 
These variations are dictated by data availability. Although the PIA data set does not   7
produce a Herfindahl index of market concentration, it does provide CR4 as well as CR8. In 
what follows we look at each one of these ratios as a determinant of the entry process and of 
total factor productivity, as well as investigate whether any their effects occur in non-linear 
fashion. We follow Geroski, Roberts and Tybout in hypothesizing that concentration ratios 
are inversely related to entry.  
The intuition behind industry capital output ratio ( / KY ) as a potential entry determinant 
is that it captures the magnitude of the necessary sunk costs that new entrants incur to start 
operating in a given industry. This is usually though of as a powerful deterrent to net firm 
creation and we thus expect that higher capital/output rations would be inversely related to 
entry. The variable minimum efficient scale (MES ) allows one other way of capturing these 
ideas. Entry is expected to be more difficult in sectors with larger average workforce. 
Lastly, the growth rate of real output of a sector (Gr) is used to capture the economic 
conditions faced by the firms operating in the sector in a particular year. Roberts shows that 
entry and exit rates in developing countries tend to be higher (lower) in periods of expansion 
(contraction),10 yet this relationship is not unconditional: “if adjustment costs are small and 
sunk costs of entry are large, as is likely when the technology in use is very capital intensive, 
most variation in demand should be met by changes in the sizes of continuing plants. Large 
or permanent increases in demand would be required to boost profits sufficiently to cover the 
sunk costs of entry and thus to induce entry. Conversely, if marginal adjustment costs 
increase rapidly with changes in plant size, then entry and exit should play a larger role as a 
source of changes in supply” (1996, p. 26-27).  
A last issue we look at is the role of exports as an entry determinant. There are a number 
of studies examining the impact of export orientation, export intensity and effective rates of 
protection on productivity across industrial plants (Tybout, 1996a). Our data set includes 
information not only on export intensity but also on the composition of the share of output 
that is exported every year. This information is broken-down in terms of the share of output 
exported to Mercosul countries ( cos Mer ul ) and to all other destinations ( cos N Mer ul − ). 
Notice that this information is a sectoral average per year, thus in sectors in which export 
opportunities abound (and conditional on capital intensity as a main sunk cost) we expect 
entry to be higher.
11   
Our main results are as follows. Table 3.1 reports fixed-effects estimates of our model of 
the determinants of gross firm entry rates. Notice that the Hausman test support the choice of 
fixed- against random-effects throughout. We find that concentration ratios (CR4 and CR8) 
are not important explanatory variables, and nor is the capital-output ratio (or the average 
firm size for that matter). The latter is not surprising in light of the fact that this result on the 
capital-output ratio concur with the many other findings for instance for Chile, Colombia and 
Morocco. The evidence from these countries with respect to concentration is more mixed 
though. Tybout and Haddad et al. reports inconclusive evidence on a negative effect for Chile 
and Morocco, respectively, while Roberts presents evidence that concentration has a positive 
effect on entry in Colombia in the first years of the sample. Although we would expect that 
entry would be less costly in less concentrated sectors, our coefficients are never statistically 
significant and thus our results are not as helpful as we hoped in throwing light on this issue.  
Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, sectors that export a higher share of their 
output tend to have higher entry rates, and this is particularly strong for the case of export 
                                                 
10 Note that GDP growth rates in Brazil were 4.2% in 1995, 2.7% in 1996, 3.3% in 1997, 0.2% in 1998, 0.5% in 1999, 4.4% 
in 2000, 1.3% in 2001 and 1.9% in 2002. 
11 Haddad, de Melo and Horton (1996) use data from Morocco and report that the share of exports in output is a significant 
predictor of entry, but not of exit rates. Tybout (1996b) and Roberts (1996b) assess the effect of import penetration instead, 
in Colombia and Chile respectively, but find no evidence of a robust significant effect.   8
shares to Mercosul countries.
12 Our interpretation of this result is that the Mercosul free trade 
agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay markets have experienced 
greater rates of entry because these provide a secure and protected market in capital-intensive 
goods in which Brazil has to various degrees lost international competitiveness. The 3-digit 
sectors for which we observe higher export shares to Mercosul are: automotive and 
automotive-related, steel, chemicals and pulp and paper sectors (three-digit CNAE).  
It is important to notice that although the R-square values we report are admittedly low, 
especially in light of the fact that fixed-effects are being taken into account, they are in line 
with those reported elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Perotti and Volpin, 2004).  
Table 3.2 reports fixed-effects estimates of our model of the determinants of gross exit 
rates. The values of the R-squares are still low and even less coefficients come close to show 
usual levels of statistical significance. One interesting finding is that of mortality rates being 
higher in sectors that are less likely to export to non-Mercosul markets, which is somewhat in 
line with our findings above about gross entry rates. Note also that sectors that were growing 
slower also experienced lower rates of mortality (the coefficient is significant at 10% 
throughout.)  
Table 3.3 has our results for net entry rates. The only one factor that seems to play a 
relatively important role in terms of net entry is the share of sectoral output exported to 
Mercosul countries (the coefficient is significant at 10% throughout.) Notice that if we have 
the total number of firms in the sector instead of the concentration ratio, the coefficient on the 
former is also positive and statistically significant. 
We further investigate the determinants of entry issue in three ways. First, we re-run all 
these specification using the Arellano-Bond estimator. The expectation here would be that 
this would help us understand the cross-sectoral process of convergence of entry rates pointed 
out by Geroski (1995) and, in doing so, help us assess the robustness of the results above. We 
find, first, that all the results reported above remain and, second, that the lagged dependent 
variable (capturing the speed of convergence) despite carrying the expected negative sign, is 
significant only for the case of gross and net entry rates with a coefficient value that we deem 
too small for yearly data (.23 and .27 to gross and net entry respectively).  
Second, we used quantile regression to investigate whether the determinants would 
change across the entry rates range. We find some interesting differences. For the .25 and .50 
quantiles, the coefficients on the concentration ratios are significant, while that is no the case 
for the .75 quantile (the very same result obtains for net entry rates). For mortality rates, the 
coefficient on concentration ratios is significant and negative for the .25 quantile, but 
significant and positive for the .5 and .75 quantile.  
Thirdly, we split the years in our sample into those in which real per capita GDP was 
contracting and those in which it was expanding. Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show these 
interesting results. We find that exports to Mercosul are mainly important to entry rates 
during recessionary years, while vis-à-vis gross exit we find that the effect of sectoral growth 
is observed basically in expansionary periods and that of exports to non-Mercosul countries is 
observed basically in contractionary years. With respect to net entry, only in good years we 
verify the positive effect of sectoral growth as well as only in bad years we can observe the 
positive effect of Mercosul-destined exports. We still find almost no support for the effects of 
concentration and capital-output ratios.  
We have also investigated the consequences of splitting the sample in high and low-tech 
sectors, defined as those with a share of expenditures in Research and Development in 
revenue above and below the median (which is about 4%).
13 We find that share of exports to 
                                                 
12 Notice that this set of results is robust to the addition of a variable reflecting the sectoral average share of inputs that were 
imported in a given year.  
13 These are not show for the sake of space, but are available from the authors’ upon request.   9
Mercosul is an important determinant of gross entry rates (and of net entry rates) only in the 
low tech sectors (expenditures below median.) We also find some evidence that sectoral 
growth is an important determinant of gross exit rates only for the high-tech sectors (the 
relationship is negative.) 
We now turn to the question of how entry and exit rates affect average sectoral total 
factor productivity (TFP). With respect to the determinants of TFP, we follow Haddad et al. 
(1996) and estimate: 
 
TFP = f (entry rates; real output growth, industry CR4,industry capital/output ratio, year 
dummies, industry dummies) 
 
Table 3.7 shows our first set of results in this regard. Although the values of our R-
squares are still worrisomely low, we find that sectors that grow faster tend to be 
systematically associated with higher productivity. More interestingly are the findings that 
gross exit and net entry rates both show the expected yet highly significant effects on total 
factor productivity.
14 Our results suggest that higher net entry rates are observed in sectors 
with higher productivity, and that lower exit rates are observed in sectors with higher 
productivity. It is interesting to note that exports, both to Mercosul and non-Mercosul 
markets, seem to be a powerful boost to average sectoral productivity levels.  
Table 3.8 reproduces these results, but splitting the sample years in those in which per 
capita GDP expanded from those in which it contracted. There are two interesting results 
worth mentioning. One is that the statistical significance of sectoral growth as a determinant 
of TFP only appears for those years in which per capita GDP contracted. Another noteworthy 
result is that export intensity (share to non-Mercosul markets) is highly correlated with TFP 
irrespective of GDP movements.  
Finally, and more importantly, the results in Table 3.8 confirm gross exit as a major 
determinant of inter-sectoral total factor productivity: lower exit rates translate into higher 
TFP levels in contracting and slightly more strongly in years in which per capita GDP 
actually grew. If we substitute lagged gross exit for gross exit, to at least acknowledge the 
endogeneity issue, the results are not affect qualitatively and the coefficient on exit remains 
negative and statistically significant.  Table 3.8 also shows that the mixed effect of entry on 
productivity: in boom years, entry is positively related to TFP, while it is inversely related to 




This paper tried to further our understanding of the determinants of firm entry and exit in 
developing countries and their effects on aggregate sectoral productivity, using panel data for 
104 Brazilian manufacturing sectors (3-digit level) for the period 1996 to 2002. The first part 
of the paper describes in detail the entry process, broadly defined as encompassing gross 
entry, gross exit and net entry. We find large cross-sector variation: for instance, net entry 
rate averages 4% and ranges from -22% to 36%. Among those sectors with above average 
rates, the most important were sectors such as pulp and paper and clothing and textiles. 
Among those sectors with large positive changes in entry rates, the most important were 
sectors such as chemicals, optical and precision instruments, and machinery. The second part 
of the paper presents panel estimates of the determinants of entry, exit and productivity. Our 
                                                 
14 Notice that these results do not change qualitatively if we use labour productivity instead of TFP, specify CR8 instead of 
CR4 as the measure of concentration in the sector, size of the average firm instead of capital-output ration, or only the share 
of output exported to Mercosul countries.  
15 We also split the sample in terms of the ratio of R&D expenditures to revenue (median value is approximately 4%). This 
information is only available for one year (2000) and is from IBGE’s PINTEC at the two-digit level. The results above do 
not change qualitatively if we split the sample along R&D expenditures (results available from the authors upon request.)    10
results show that the share of exports in sectoral output is one main determinant of entry and 
exit rates. The results also suggest that in years of real per capita GDP decline, export 
propensity is associated with entry rates, while in years of GDP expansion, sectoral growth is 
positively associated with net entry. Finally, our results show that exit (and to a lesser extent, 
entry and net entry) is a very robust determinant of total factor productivity across industrial 
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Table 2.1  
Basic statistics (pooled data) 
 
  N. Obs  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max 
Gross entry  594  13.86  5.81  0.00  44.48 
Gross exit  594  9.80  3.69  0.00  33.33 
Net entry  594  4.06  5.74  -22.22  36.17 
CR4 687  0.41  0.24  0.03  1.00 
CR8 687  0.52  0.25  0.07  1.00 
Capital output ratio  685  0.29  0.82  0.00  12.69 
MES (average size of firm)  685  205.14  642.235  12.77  6994.87 
Growth sectoral output  587  15.40  30.95  -77.47  285.36 
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What determines gross firm entry rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate 
CR4 1.13    0.954  0.8 
 [3.611]    [3.633]  [3.617] 
Sectoral  growth  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Capital output ratio  -0.327  -0.325    -0.212 
  [0.428]  [0.428]  [0.437] 
Share of sales to Mercosul  0.246  0.247  0.241  0.204 
 [0.080]**  [0.080]**  [0.080]**  [0.086]* 
CR8   0.854     
   [3.686]     
Size of average firm (#workers)      0   
     [0.001]  
Share of sales to non-Mercosul        -0.063 
       [0.047] 
Constant 12.937  12.951  12.84  13.94 
  [1.498]** [1.934]** [1.496]** [1.672]** 
Observations  587 587 587 587 
Number of Sector 3 digit   CNAE  98  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 




What determines gross firm exit rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate 
CR4 2.418    2.724  1.917 
 [2.315]    [2.325]  [2.299] 
Sectoral  growth  -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 
 [0.004]*  [0.004]*  [0.004]*  [0.004] 
Capital output ratio  -0.043  -0.039    0.131 
 [0.275]  [0.275]    [0.277] 
Share of sales to Mercosul  0.064  0.07  0.065  0.001 
  [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.055] 
CR8   -0.172     
   [2.366]     
Size of average firm (#workers)      -0.001   
     [0.001]   
Share of sales to non-Mercosul        -0.095 
       [0.030]** 
Constant 8.877  9.94  8.904  10.398 
  [0.960]** [1.242]** [0.957]** [1.063]** 
Observations  587 587 587 587 
Number of Sector 3 digit  CNAE   98  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level       15
 
Table 3.3 
What determines net firm entry rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate 
CR4 -1.287    -1.77  -1.117 
  [4.467]  [4.489]  [4.481] 
Sectoral  growth  0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Capital output ratio  -0.284  -0.286    -0.343 
  [0.530]  [0.530]  [0.541] 
Share  of  sales  to  Mercosul  0.182 0.177 0.176 0.203 
  [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.107] 
CR8   1.027    
   [4.559]    
Size of average firm (#workers)      0.001   
     [0.001]  
Share of sales to non-Mercosul        0.032 
      [0.058] 
Constant  4.059 3.011 3.935 3.542 
  [1.853]* [2.393] [1.848]* [2.072] 
Observations  587 587 587 587 
Number of Sector 3 digit CNAE  98  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Standard errors in brackets * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.4 
What determines gross firm entry rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002 in output-contracting and –expanding years? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate  Entry rate 
  Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand 
CR4  1.086 1.681      0.761 1.253 1.781 0.934 
 [6.303]  [5.260]      [6.321] [5.306] [6.215] [5.175] 
Sectoral  growth  -0.008 0.02 -0.008 0.02 -0.008  0.022  -0.013  0.021 
  [0.008] [0.015] [0.008] [0.015] [0.008] [0.014] [0.008] [0.014] 
Capital output ratio  -0.327  -0.212  -0.336 -0.202      -0.787 0.117 
  [0.496] [1.040] [0.496] [1.048]    [0.519]  [1.029] 
Share  of  sales  to  Mercosul  0.422 0.077 0.422 0.077 0.417 0.069 0.602 -0.001 
  [0.114]** [0.150] [0.113]** [0.151] [0.114]** [0.151] [0.132]** [0.150] 
CR8     2.578  0.849      
     [6.121]  [5.625]      
Size of average firm (#workers)          0.001  0.001     
       [0.002]  [0.001]    
Share of sales to non-Mercosul              0.242  -0.169 
         [0.093]**  [0.060]** 
Constant  12.696 12.646 11.799 12.891 12.593 12.606  9.122  15.244 
  [2.569]** [2.264]** [3.202]** [3.031]** [2.580]** [2.222]** [2.877]** [2.410]** 
Observations  294 293 294 293 294 293 294 293 
Number  of  Sector  3  digit    CNAE  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R-squared  0.08 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.05 
Standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level             
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Table 3.5 
What determines gross firm exit rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002 in output-contracting and –expanding years? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate  Exit rate 
  Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand 
CR4  4.442  1.38      4.749 1.696 3.944 0.873 
  [4.597]  [2.964]    [4.593] [2.988] [4.535] [2.889] 
Sectoral  growth  -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 -0.018 
  [0.006] [0.008]* [0.006] [0.008]* [0.006] [0.008]* [0.006] [0.008]* 
Capital  output  ratio  -0.117 0.104 -0.107 0.076      0.213 0.327 
  [0.361] [0.586] [0.363] [0.591]    [0.379]  [0.574] 
Share  of  sales  to  Mercosul  0.105 0.044 0.115 0.046 0.101 0.049 -0.024 -0.01 
  [0.083] [0.085] [0.083] [0.085] [0.083] [0.085] [0.096] [0.084] 
CR8     0.801  -0.838      
     [4.476]  [3.170]      
Size of average firm (#workers)          -0.002  -0.001     
       [0.002]  [0.001]    
Share  of  sales  to  non-Mercosul         -0.174  -0.115 
         [0.068]*  [0.034]** 
Constant  7.699 9.632 9.059  10.639  7.865 9.641  10.264  11.395 
  [1.873]** [1.276]** [2.341]** [1.708]** [1.875]** [1.252]** [2.099]** [1.346]** 
Observations  294 293 294 293 294 293 294 293 
Number  of  Sector  3  digit  classif  CNAE  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 
Standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level               18 
 
Table 3.6 
What determines net firm entry rates in Brazil from 1996 to 2002 in output-contracting and –expanding years? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
 
  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate  Firm net entry rate 
  Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand 
CR4  -3.356 0.301      -3.988 -0.443 -2.163 0.061 
  [8.298] [6.293]      [8.301] [6.342] [8.080] [6.309] 
Sectoral  growth  -0.002 0.038 -0.003 0.038 -0.002  0.04  -0.011 0.038 
 [0.010]  [0.017]*  [0.010]  [0.017]*  [0.010] [0.016]* [0.010] [0.017]* 
Capital output ratio  -0.21  -0.315  -0.229  -0.278      -1  -0.21 
  [0.653] [1.245] [0.653] [1.254]      [0.675] [1.254] 
Share of sales to Mercosul  0.318 0.033 0.307 0.031 0.316  0.02  0.627 0.008 
  [0.150]* [0.180] [0.149]* [0.180] [0.149]*  [0.180] [0.171]** [0.183] 
CR8     1.777  1.687      
     [8.065]  [6.726]      
Size of average firm (#workers)          0.002  0.001     
       [0.003]  [0.002]    
Share  of  sales  to  non-Mercosul         0.416  -0.054 
         [0.120]**  [0.073] 
Constant 4.996  3.014  2.74  2.252 4.728 2.965 -1.142 3.849 
  [3.382] [2.709] [4.218] [3.625] [3.388] [2.656] [3.739] [2.938] 
Observations  294 293 294 293 294 293 294 293 
Number  of  Sector  3  digit  CNAE  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 
Standard errors in brackets * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.7 
What determines total factor productivity (log) in Brazil from 1996 to 2002? 
Fixed-effects panel estimates 
  Total factor productivity (log)  Total factor productivity (log)  Total factor productivity (log)  Total factor productivity (log) 
      
CR4 0.39  0.39  0.427  0.402 
 [0.219]  [0.219]  [0.210]*  [0.216] 
Growth Rate of Sectoral Output  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** 
Capital  output  ratio  -0.072 -0.071 -0.065 -0.068 
 [0.026]**  [0.026]**  [0.025]*  [0.026]** 
Share of sales to MERCOSUL  0.014  0.013  0.013  0.012 
  [0.005]* [0.005]* [0.005]* [0.005]* 
Share of sales to non-MERCOSUL   0.03  0.031  0.027  0.03 
  [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** 
Entry rate    0.002     
   [0.003]     
Exit  rate     -0.028  
     [0.004]**   
Firm net entry rate        0.008 
       [0.002]** 
Constant 10.25  10.219  10.572  10.219 
  [0.103]** [0.111]** [0.110]** [0.102]** 
Observations 580  580  580  580 
Number of Sector 3 digit classif CNAE   97  97  97  97 
R-squared 0.2  0.2  0.27  0.23 
Standard errors in brackets * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.8 
What determines total factor productivity (log) in Brazil from 1996 to 2002 in output-expanding and contracting year? 


























  Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand Contract Expand 
CR4  0.294 0.294 0.287 0.292 0.382 0.321 0.346 0.295 
  [0.319] [0.371] [0.300] [0.368] [0.294] [0.356] [0.279] [0.372] 
Sectoral  growth  0.002 0 0.003 0 0.002  -0.001  0.002 0 
  [0.000]** [0.001] [0.000]** [0.001] [0.000]** [0.001] [0.000]** [0.001] 
Capital output ratio  -0.046  -0.117  -0.03  -0.113 -0.037 -0.107 -0.023 -0.117 
  [0.027] [0.074] [0.025] [0.073] [0.024] [0.071] [0.023] [0.074] 
Share  of  sales  to  Mercosul  0.013 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.011 0.017  0  0.015 
  [0.007] [0.012] [0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.011] [0.006] [0.012] 
Share of sales to non-Mercosul  0.027  0.033  0.022  0.03  0.02  0.028  0.017  0.033 
  [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** 
Entry  rate     0.018  -0.01      
     [0.003]**  [0.005]*      
Exit  rate       -0.028  -0.038    
       [0.005]**  [0.009]**    
Firm  net  entry  rate         0.019  0.001 
         [0.003]**  [0.004] 
Constant  10.314 10.336 10.152 10.511 10.641 10.767 10.358  10.33 
  [0.147]** [0.175]** [0.142]** [0.195]** [0.146]** [0.197]** [0.129]** [0.177]** 
Observations  290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Number  of  Sector  3  digit  CNAE  97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R-squared  0.29 0.2 0.38  0.22 0.4 0.27  0.46 0.2 
Standard errors in brackets * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 